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AAbstract
The rapid turnover and acceptance of technology advancements have driven down their
cost to consumers.  This has led to improvements in content delivery mechanisms, which 
in turn, allows media distributors to place a premium on the consumer’s freedom to choose 
the means of media delivery.  However, traditional media distributors such as the music, 
movie, and television industries have rejected new business models based on these 
technology advancements.  Additionally, the Dot-Com Era instilled society with a 
burdensome set of social norms such that computer piracy is becoming accepted as a 
victimless crime; a view staunchly rejected by artists and copyright holders.  In an attempt 
to preserve their cartel structure, media companies have adopted a strategy of legal and 
governmental action that has driven consumers from the marketplace.  Finally, the media 
industry’s oligopoly cannot exist and grow in a free market economy such as the U.S.  
Therefore, traditional media must consider the shifting trends and market threats in order to 
protect their creative content and realign social norms achievable by utilizing better 
management of the content supply chain.
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1Introduction
Not even the Fountain of Youth will let an industry cheat death.  As demanding 
people, society constantly seeks efficiency, advancement, and change in industry in order 
to persist.  Technological advancement represents a prime example of this evolutionary 
trend.  While technology based products were initially considered large capital 
investments, upgrades and obsolescence now encompass life cycles so short they are 
simply rolled into the cost of doing business1.  On the consumer end of the spectrum, the 
rapid turnover in technology has driven down costs and made cutting-edge access to the 
digital world accessible to the masses2.  Technology advancements have not only led to 
wide scale accessibility, but also improvements in content delivery mechanisms.  As the 
content delivery systems have improved in efficiency and become more accessible to a 
wider range of audiences the ability to provide on-demand media has permitted distributors 
to place a premium on the freedom of choice.  However, the premium cost has not been 
adopted in all cases, especially in traditional music, movie, and television distribution, but 
these industries have not curbed the demand for such advancements.
Society has developed a burdensome set of social norms.  With the advent of large-
scale file sharing and publicity surrounding peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, society shifted to 
the mentality that computer piracy was perfectly acceptable because it was a victimless 
crime.  However, copyright holders contest they were as much a victim as in any robbery.  
The copyright holder’s needs began to be addressed by media studios and representative 
1
 Within slow computing organizations such as government agencies, the expected life cycle of desktops is 4-
5 years and laptops 2-3 years with a 20% failure rate.
PC Life Cycles: Guidelines for Establishing Life Cycles for Personal Computers, Texas Department of 
Information Resources, 5-6 (Jan. 2003) <http://www.dir.state.tx.us/eod/pc/pc-cycle.pdf>.
2
 As of March 18, 2004, 74.9% of consumers above the age of two had access to the Internet.
Web Access at 75 Percent, Wired News (March 18, 2004)
<http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,62712,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_5>. 
2groups such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA) largely through a series of threats, lobbyist 
actions, and lawsuits.  In lieu of all the money being filtered through the legal and political 
system, the social norms were not shifted into a model that could meet both the consumer 
and copyright holder’s needs.  This has long been an issue vocalized by consumers, but 
rarely addressed by media groups.  At the root of all this is the media industries inability to 
recognize their imminent death as a result of failure to adequately maximize their 
competitive advantages in representing their constituents.  
When dealing with large, intertwined industries like movie and music companies, 
the onus must be placed on the distributors and representative groups to harness changes in 
technology; not only to protect, but to disseminate artists’ works.  The media companies
have adopted a strategy of legal and governmental action which has driven consumers 
from the marketplace in an attempt to brainwash consumer thought.  The copyright holders 
and their representative groups must consider both the present results and side effects of 
their current tactics in calculating a future strategy.  It is essential they protect their creative 
content and realign social norms by utilizing market trends and technological advances to 
better manage the content supply chain and preserve industry growth.
I. Technological and Digital Distribution Evolutions
Over the course of time technology advancements and relaxed federal regulation 
have had grandiose effects on the media and content delivery industries.  The cable 
industry, for example, has propelled growth through market forces.  Beginning in the 
1980s, the cable industry experienced rapid growth resulting from market deregulation and 
3the introduction of new technology, namely satellite-delivered cable systems3.  As a result, 
cable has emerged as a fifty-one billion dollar a year industry with nearly seventy-four 
million users in the United States4 and has experienced an 80% growth rate between 1992 
and 20035.  The movie industry is another industry that has benefited from similar factors.
The movie industry, while lagging as of late, has experienced remarkable growth 
with the introduction of new technology.  The movie industry has a viewer base where,
“Over 70% of the population rents or goes to movies regularly, thus accounting for over 
1.5 billion movie attendances each year in the U.S.,” as of 20016.  Home movie sales on 
VHS and DVD have also significantly increased revenue for the movie studios.  In 2004, 
home video purchases were up an additional 15% from 2003 and estimated to close out the 
year at approximately $16.5 billion in sales7.  DVD sales alone have experienced a growth 
thirty times over between 1998 and 20038.  Some argue access to these revenue streams 
would not be permitted at all had the prediction of Jack Valenti, then president of the 
MPAA, before the U.S. Senate in 1984 had come true.  Mr. Valenti, in referring to the 
advent of Sony Corporation’s Betamax machine such that, “the VCR is to the American 
film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home 
3 Roni Mueller & Gretchen Wattig, The "New" Series Co-Production Deal in Network Series Television, 31 
Sw. U. L. Rev. 627, 655 (2002).
4 Industry Overview: Statistics & Resources, National Cable and Telecommunications Association (May 
2004) <http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=86>.  
 
5 Jim Trautman, Cable's Economic Influence Grows, National Cable and Telecommunications Association
(August 11, 2003) <http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=325>. 
 
6
 James Jaeger, The Movie Industry, Matrixx Entertainment Corporations (visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
<http://www.mecfilms.com/moviepubs/memos/moviein.htm>.
7 Thomas K. Arnold, DVD Update, The Hollywood Reporter (Oct. 14, 2004)
<http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/television/feature_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000672279>. 
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4alone.9”  This prophecy was not accepted by the Supreme Court10 and now advances in 
technology are feeding the media industries.  Yet, as if history needed to be re-mastered, 
the story is being re-released.
II. Content Distribution and Piracy Battle Plans
While evolutions and advancements in technology have brought forth growth for 
the media industries, one major wide-scale advancement has also lead to an 
insurmountable task for content distributors.  That advancement is the accessibility to the 
Internet and cyberspace.  
The Internet, or more generally, computers sharing processes via communication 
channels have been in existence for many years.  Between 1977 and 1978, the first Bulletin 
Board Service (BBS) was introduced, which allowed anyone with a computer and a 
modem to connect to another computer and download files11.  It may be argued that since 
that time, the scope of the architecture has not changed, but rather the scale of the 
distribution system.  While users no longer depend on direct connections from one 
computer to the other, users still generally use their computers to explore countless files 
and information existing in a world built not on brick and mortar, but rather electron 
transfer.  One-to-one BBS connections have been replaced by a global network of servers, 
routers, hubs, and PCs.  Most importantly, the ease of use and related, complex marketing 
trends have brought what was once a mostly underground system into the mainstream.  
9 20th Anniversary of Betamax: the Court Case that Brought You the VCR, Public Knowledge (visited Nov. 
3, 2004) <http://www.publicknowledge.org/content/cases/betamax%20case/>.
10 See generally, Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
11 See generally, Henry Edward Hardy, The History of the Net (Sept. 28, 1993) (unpublished Master's thesis, 
Grand Valley State University) (available at <http://china.si.umich.edu/econ495/docs/hardy_net.history.txt>).
5Unfortunately the problems that existed in the digital underground still exists in the 
mainstream Internet; users are trading copyrighted material with complete disregard for the 
copyright holder’s rights.  This issue is one the movie and music industries did not face 
during the BBS era; however the software industry has been through it before.
The software industry has had to deal with piracy via underground trading for 
years.  In 1996, the software industry estimated a $2.3 billion loss in the U.S. and $11.3 
billion loss globally as a result of piracy12.  As of 2002 the numbers decreased to an 
estimated $2 billion in lost revenue in the U.S., but $13 billion globally13.  These numbers 
represent a piracy rate over three times larger than that estimated by the music or movie 
industry14.  In lieu of this, the software industry has not made the mistake of leading a 
campaign to annihilate all potential home pirates as in the music and movie industry.  The 
reason the software industry has more experienced in dealing with piracy is because of
their product’s format; software has always been digital, making it very easy to copy15.  
Similar to what the media industries are now experiencing, software can be easily 
reproduced and the second copy is exactly the same as the original.  Further, in the 
software industry, as new technology, copying methods, and communication methods have 
emerged, they have not fought to subdue these upgrades, but rather use them to operate 
more efficiently and to decrease their overall operating costs.  
12 Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 235, 240 n.12 (1999).
13 Software Piracy Fact Sheet, Business Software Alliance, pg. 1 (visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
<http://www.bsa.org/resources/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=1292&hitboxdone
=yes>. 
14 Anti-Piracy, Recording Industry Association of America (visited Nov. 4, 2004) 
<http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp>.
15 Tanya Poth, The Computer Piracy Superhighway, 28 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 469, 472 (2000).
6To balance consumer demand and copyright protection, the software industry has 
taken a multi-tiered approach to curbing piracy16.  First, they have created international 
organizations to raise awareness as to relevant intellectual property issues17.  Second, they 
have used existing technology to increase security features associated with the use and 
distribution of software18.  Third, the software industry has created trade groups focused on 
education, amnesty, and litigation of piracy related issues19.  This multi-tiered approach in 
conjunction with revised business models has had a distinct impact on lowering software 
piracy rates20.  The Business Software Alliance (BSA) is the primary trade group for the 
software industry in relation to software piracy.  The:
BSA stated that piracy rates have been falling modestly since 1994. The 
organization discusses several reasons for the decline, including lowering 
the price of commercial software to make it more affordable. Also, 
governments are taking a more active role in protecting intellectual property 
rights within their own borders and in relation to international trade21
This approach may sound similar to the method pursued by the movie and music industry.  
So why has the result been different?  Why have piracy rates been growing in the visual 
and audio media markets while falling in the software realm?  There are a number of 
distinguishing factors which must be addressed in order to understand the dichotomy.  
16 Id. at 483.
17 Id. at 484-485.
18 Id. at 486-487.
19 Id. at 487-490.
20 Id. at 491.
21 Id.
7III. Industry Power Structures Drive Regulation and Norms
There are a number of factors that distinguish the software industry and their effort 
to stop piracy from that of the music and movie industry.  Many of the major issues are
rooted in current social norms and the manner of strategy execution, but the most 
important factors relate to the manner in which the industries operate.
A. Identifying Industry Power Structures
One major distinguishing factor between the battle over copyrights in the software 
and media industries is the number of competitors within the market place.  The software 
industry is able to adjust its operating model based on a competitive, free market economy 
approach defined by:
dynamic, vigorous competition… [where] the early entrants into a new
software category quickly captures a lion's share of the sales, while other 
products in the category are either driven out altogether or relegated to 
niche positions. What eventually displaces the leader is often not 
competition from another product within the same software category, but 
rather a technological advance that renders the boundaries defining the 
category obsolete.22
While it may be contended that this view is a static market analysis, in the software 
industry, the overall barriers to entry are low based on substitute products, seller power, 
buyer power, and the sheer number of new entrants23.  Considering the media industries’
model, the free market economy approach does not provide scale as in the software 
industry.  
22 Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust for the Economy of Ideas: The Logic of Technology Markets, 14 Harv. J. 
Law & Tec 83, 132 (2000), citing United States v. Microsoft, 65 F. Supp 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 1999).
23
 Juho Lindman, Effects of Open Source Software on the Business Patterns of Software Industry 25 (Fall 
2004) (unpublished master's thesis, Helsinki School of Economics Department of Management) (available at 
<http://www.greywolves.org/~deltax/gradu.rtf>).
8One popular mentality advocated is that the music and movie industries operate 
under a monopolistic model and use this power to exert strength over governmental and 
social choice24.  In his book Free Culture Lawrence Lessig presents this idea on numerous 
occasions25.  Mr. Lessig states powerful arguments in regard to this approach, however, 
there is one major flaw in this presentation; the media industries do not fit into a standard 
monopolistic model.  Traditional media operates as an oligopoly.  This distinction is not 
simply rhetoric and must be examined carefully in order to better understand the operating 
regime.
Since the software industry is operating based on a free market economy model, 
prices are set by auction26.  In this model, market place pricing is set by what the 
consumers are willing to pay compared to the relative competition27.  As new entrants 
move into the market, prices are distinguished by supply and demand as well as 
competitive behavior and competitive positioning or product differentiation28.  In the 
software industry, through the use of technology and the market progress, the experience 
curve has shifted and firms have become both more effective and efficient.  However, 
monopolies and oligopolies are infused with inherently different operations.
24 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 88-94 (Penguin Books 2004). 
25 Id.
26
 Interview with William Spaulding, Lecturer of Management, Wayne State University School of Business 
Administration, in Detroit, MI (May 24, 2004).
27 MICHAEL HITT ET AL., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 57 (6th ed., Thompson Pub. 2004).
28 Id. at 56-59.
9In a monopoly in the U.S., there are not one, but rather two primary players; the 
firm in question and the government29.   In a monopoly there may be relatively inelastic 
demand curves meaning that consumer demand does not fluctuate significantly based on 
product price30.  However in a true monopolistic market in the U.S., the government has 
the right to regulate change or decline a change in pricing31.  On the other hand, an 
oligopoly consists of relatively few competitors where pricing and strategic decisions by 
one firm directly affect the output of other firms32.  When analyzing markets operating as 
an oligopoly, it is apparent there are profit incentives for the firms to cooperate in the 
decision-making process, which in turn could lead to collusion33.  So why is this 
distinction important in the media industries?  Namely because of the power an oligopoly
industry possesses over a monopolistic industry.
A monopoly that seeks to exclude firms from the market or impair their ability to 
compete cannot exist unless it is regulated by the government34.  Therefore, regulated 
monopolies, such as utilities, have their prices set by the government35.  An oligopoly also 
exhibits what is commonly known as monopolistic tendencies, however, since there are 
29 Interview with William Spaulding, Lecturer of Management, Wayne State University School of Business 
Administration, in Detroit, MI (May 31, 2004).
30 WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MICROECONOMICS 200 (5th ed., Thompson Pub. 2000).
31 Id. at 197-198.
32 Ted Bergstrom, Oligopoly, University of California, Santa Barabara Department of Economics, slide 2
(visited Nov. 1, 2004) <http://econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/Courses/Ec100AF01/PPSlides/Ch27.ppt>.
33 Id. at slide 45.
34 Federal Trade Commission: Maintaining or Creating a Monopoly, Free Advice (visited Nov. 3, 2004)
<http://law.freeadvice.com/resources/gov_material/ftc_guide_to_antitrust_laws_monopoly.htm>.
35 Chapter 11, Oswego State University of New York, Department of Economics (visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
<http://www.oswego.edu/~economic/eco101/chap11/chap11.htm>.
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more firms involved with the competition, there is more freedom to act36.  There are an 
identifiable number of firms involved in the media industries and as a corollary, there is 
similar pricing; the price for a CD distributed by Sony tends to be similar to a CD released 
by Warner Music.   Particularly, in the music industry, five firms control 80% of all titles 
produced in the U.S.37  Based on this, there is a risk for both predatory pricing and 
collusion.  While it may be difficult to identify collusion, the lobbying effort by the record 
industries for stiffer copyright protection seems to be a perfect example38.  This arguably 
collusive behavior is reflected in the treatment of the artists as well.
B. Fitting an Elephant through the Eye of a Needle
The balance between copyright holders and the media companies that distribute the 
works presents an undeniable dichotomy between creator’s rights and big business.  The 
Congressional Budget Office produced a report that appropriately cites the distinction as, 
“the ability of copyright holders and the industries that market and distribute creative 
products to find ways of applying those new technologies to generate sufficient returns to 
maintain the flow of new creative works.39”  However, the lobbying efforts by the media 
industry attempt to shift the view such that they are not media distributors or copyright 
holder representatives, but rather creators themselves.  This is an important distinction 
because it clarifies the motivation of the media groups’ efforts to lobby, litigate, and 
36 MCEACHERN, supra note 30, at 230-234.
37 Industry Brief: Music Recording 1, Oligopoly Watch (June 28, 2003) 
<http://www.oligopolywatch.com/2003/06/28.html>. 
 
38 LESSIG, supra note 24, at 248-268.
39 Copyright Issues in Digital Media, Congressional Budget Office vii (Aug. 2004) (available at 
<http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-09-Copyright.pdf>).
11
generally enforce copyright related issues.  The focus is not on preserving creative content, 
but rather protecting a product and revenue stream40.  Further, the media industries are 
having their livelihood threatened, not by the evils of digital media piracy, but rather 
technology that allows simplified methods of artist cultivation, promotion, and finished 
product distribution41.  The industry’s oligopoly is being challenged by new entrants 
because the major entry barriers have been removed42.  Further, much to the dismay of the 
media industries, there has been a shift in the social norms that are driving the change.  
C. What’s Normal
The Dot-Com Era created a societal and cultural shift in the feeling toward and 
treatment of Internet based goods.  As companies went live with electronic businesses and 
stepped away from traditional brick-and-mortar enterprises, corporate valuation was no 
longer based on debt, revenue, and sales, but rather clicks and unique visits43; the more 
visitors, the higher a company’s stock rose44.  In an effort to get unique views and click 
through users, the online enterprises established a unique pricing scheme to drive users to 
their electronic stores.  The bottom-line price was often free and in many cases when a 
company attempted to charge for service, a competitor arose that undercut the pricing and 
40 Music to Whose Ears? University of California-Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law Conference on the 
Debate over Digital Music 11 (April 6, 2000) (available at 
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/events/roundtable99/background.pdf>).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 12.  
43 Jerry Useem, Dot-coms What Have We Learned?, Fortune, Oct. 30, 2000, at 82.
44 Jack Wilson, eBusiness: The Hope, the Hype, the Power, the Pain, Univ. of Massachusetts (visited Nov. 3, 
2004) <http://www.jackmwilson.com/eBusiness/eBusinessBook/Finances.htm>.
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competed by giving away the service45.  The Dot-Com Era pricing structures created the 
first push toward shifting the socially normal view of “access pricing” on the Internet, 
which was only echoed with the advent of peer-to-peer file sharing systems46.
The rise of P2P file sharing technology and its widespread use only propagated the 
social norm we see persisting today47.   The media industries have used the litigation side 
of their strategy to fight this social norm and attempt to return some order to media content 
distribution48.  What is being overlooked by the media distributors is that this social norm 
is an intricate attitude that can be used to furnish new revenue streams.  While some 
believe that, “so many people… knowingly violating the law is culturally unhealthy,49” 
these attitudes simply reflect the desire for a market shift and a realignment of social 
norms.  File sharing or digital content stealing cannot be classified as a “gateway” crime in
the same way marijuana is considered a gateway drug; just because someone downloads 
the new Brittney Spears song this week does not me she will go rob a bank next week.  
Further, the social norms we are experiencing now in regard to copyrighted material are
not much different from the past.  Consumers do not pay for copyrighted material because 
it is copyright, but rather they pay for a quality product.   
Quality of produced works and related marketing leads to consumer demand, not 
the fact that there is a legal right to the work.  At one time, consumers dealt out hard 
45 Useem, supra note 43, at 82.
46 LESSIG, supra note 24, at 125-126.
47 Id.
48 WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 243 (Stanford Press 2004).
49 Id.
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earned dollars for a product called a Pet Rock, no more than an average stone in a box50.  
There were plenty of free rocks outside, but consumers were drawn to this product, which 
resulted in revenue for the company producing the product.  What can be learned from 
this?  People will pay for anything and a company can charge a premium for the right to 
choose.  You can have a dirty, unfriendly rock for free from the side of the road or a 
pleasant, well trained rock in a box for a premium.  Further, when a consumer decided to 
pick-up a free rock from the side of the road, this did not mean he was stealing from the pet 
rock industry.  He was exercising his freedom of choice in a free market economy.  While 
the pet rock analogy is not a direct correlation to the media industries,51 the fact of the 
matter is when a free market coexists with a pay market, there must be some differentiating 
factor to drive consumers to pay for a product as opposed to taking it for free.  From pet 
rocks to virtual companies, businesses over time, and namely the recent Dot-Com Era,
taught us one other thing about access pricing, free is not a price that can exist in business 
equilibrium; companies must make enough money to continue their operations.
IV. Barriers Are Being Erected on all Fronts
While there is always the potential the media and content delivery companies will 
realign their models to better reflect one of a distribution company, barriers are being 
erected by lobby groups and Congress alike.  Traditional media is acting in an effort to 
preserve the oligopoly, litigate social norms, and contain their “old guard” operations.
50 Pet Rock, Super70s.com (visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
<http://www.super70s.com/Super70s/Culture/Fads/Pet_Rocks.asp>.
51
 There were countless unclaimed rocks in nature, when dealing with digital copies of copyrighted songs, 
there are countless copies available as well, however the copyright holder lays claim to those as too.
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A. Preserve and Protect
Congress has taken the opportunity to realign the laws regarding copyright 
regulation and media distribution with guidance from major industry players.  This 
guidance has resulted in regulations reflecting the need of the competitors and not 
necessarily the consumers or creators. 
Mr. Lessig diligently outlines how the music and movie industries have used their 
power to influence Congress to extend copyright terms52.  Lessig notes that, based on a net 
present value (NPV) analysis of a company’s existing copyright, it is worth it for them to 
spend up to that NPV on lobbying efforts53.  There is a fatal flaw in this argument, though.  
This assumes that every company that owns a copyright will be able to lobby for, and 
succeed in, gaining a copyright extension based on their marginal contribution.  It is a 
popular belief that the media companies or copyright owners have unlimited power to 
engage Congress to effect copyright extensions and manipulate the laws related to their 
regulation.  However, a company itself does not necessarily have the power, so from where 
does this opinion arise?  The answer is the power of collective bargaining.  
In an oligopoly, non-associated companies may attempt to work together to form a 
cartel54.  When firms in a marketplace work together in collusive behavior to set prices, set 
quantities, and divide up the market, they have established an illegal cartel55.  Based on the 
media producers collective work via their respective trade groups (the RIAA and MPAA), 
52 LESSIG, supra note 24, at 217-218.
53 Id. at 216-217.
54 DUNCAN K. FOLEY, ECONOMIC REASONING 179 (2004) 
<http://homepage.newschool.edu/~foleyd/GECO6190/>.
55 Id.
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the media industries have created what echoes of a cartel56.  However these trade groups 
have avoided being classified or prosecuted as a cartel by a legal distinction between 
explicit and tacit collusion57.  Explicit collusion is punishable by law:
so that the act of communication is of central importance. For economists, 
however, this distinction has no meaning. In game theory models of 
collusion, the term "agreement" does not imply a formal communication -
all that is needed is for the cartel members to have an "understanding" of 
how others will react to their behavior. Such shared beliefs - whether 
acquired tacitly or not - can support a self-enforcing, collusive equilibrium58
This distinction has most likely lead to the lack of any form of antitrust action against the 
media companies; however, the distinction is irrelevant for an economic analysis.  Further, 
the distinction also has not stopped media distributors from exerting their power to 
influence Congressional and market decisions.  The most recent example of this is in the 
cable industry.
Consumer demand and technology accessibility has driven interest in what is aptly 
known as “A-La-Carte Pricing” in the cable and satellite industry59.  In A-La-Carte 
Pricing, cable subscribers are able to purchase and view only the channels in which they 
are interested, as opposed to being forced to purchase an entire cable package of 
channels60.  Cable and satellite companies have been reluctant to adopt a model of this sort 
claiming, “it would ultimately raise subscriber costs and harm diversity on the airwaves,” 
56 Dan Krimm, Creating a Merit-Based Music Economy: Compulsory or Blanket Licensing for Interactive 
Subscription Services, 19 (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Hastings Law Journal).
57 Anthony Maul, Are the Major Labels Sandbagging Online Music? An Antitrust Analysis of Strategic 
Licensing Practices, 7 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 365, 390 (2003).
58 Id.
59 Frank Ahrens, FCC Asked To Examine A la Carte Cable TV, Wash. Post, May 20, 2004, at E04.
60 Id.
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since popular channels subsidize less popular channels creating a diversity of viewing 
choices61.  But how much more could cable rates rise?  Cable prices have already risen 
three times the rate of inflation since market deregulation in 199662.  The cable companies 
claim an astronomical jump in hardware and technology upgrades are necessary to achieve 
A-La-Carte Pricing and the scheme would crush small and niche channels63.  As we see in 
the music and movie industries, the cable companies are misclassifying their industry’s 
primary purpose.  
It is not Comcast or Cox Communication’s responsibility to support fledgling 
networks.  Their job is to act as the means of delivery to end viewers.  A-La-Carte Pricing 
would not create an all or nothing situation where consumers are forced to choose only the 
channels they want, but rather build in an additional option where consumers are permitted 
to choose higher priced, single-channel options.  Further, one of the cornerstones of the 
cable industry’s argument is that smaller, niche channels would be squashed eliminating 
the wide variety of choice exhibited in the current marketplace64.  The flip side to this 
argument is a lot of the small niche networks are actually in favor of A-La-Carte Pricing, 
but do not have the collective power to push their views through to Congress or the FCC65.  
Further, the Consumers Union and the Consumer Federation of America estimates place 
the additional cost for A-La-Carte Pricing at an additional one to three dollars per month 
61 Id.
62 Frank Ahrens, Sorry -- No a la Carte Cable, Wash. Post, March 26, 2004, at E01.
63 Michael Grebb, Cable a la Carte Still Half-Baked, Wired News (Jul. 14, 2004) 
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,64203,00.html>.
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per subscriber66.  But the push for A-La-Carte Pricing would substantially open the market
to competition, which the cable companies do not want to happen.  So again consumer 
demand is subdued, and the oligopoly is preserved for now.  
Based on the cable argument, the music industry can argue that no individual songs 
should be sold because it is necessary for the good music on a CD to be purchased in 
conjunction with the less popular music to give consumers a greater diversity of options. 
This argument is flawed from a strategic prospective; for consumers it eliminates choice
and for the music industry it eliminates the opportunity for additional revenue .  It is a 
blinding task to visualize how consumers are being taken out of the marketplace and these 
oligopoly industries are given the freedom to grow and dominate, then complain to Uncle 
Sam when consumers’ demand they have their power brought into check.  So if you are in 
the media industry and you feel your power slipping away, what do you do?  Sue everyone 
you can get your hands on.
B. Damage Done
The media industry lawsuits and lobbying initially seemed to have some success at 
redefining societal norms.  However, the lawsuits have reached the point of diminishing 
marginal returns.  The media industry as a whole, including television, music, and movies, 
made over  $29.6 million in lobbying expenditures in 1998 and contributed an additional 
$16.4 million to political campaigns67. Further, the RIAA itself spent $820,000 and 
66
 A-La-Carte Pricing computations performed by Consumers Union and the Consumer Federation of 
America can be found in Appendix B.
Gene Kimmelman & Dr. Mark Cooper, Reply Comments of Consumers Union and the Consumer Federation 
of America before the Federal Communication Commission, at 2, (Aug. 13, 2004) (No. 04-027) (available at 
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$244,260 in lobbying expenditures and donations to political campaigns, respectively68.  
Further, the RIAA has spent over $16.7 million on legal fees related to the prosecution of 
piracy69.  As a result of these efforts, the RIAA has managed to recover a whopping $9.5 
million in lost profits70. Further, there are still 10.4 million households downloading music 
and, “the average number of files downloaded per household grew between April and June 
[of 2003], from 59 to 63.71”  To add insult to injury, the most recent case to be tried against 
large-scale distributors resulted in a crushing blow to the music industry72.  In MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., the court held in favor of Grokster and stated that:
if a defendant could show that its product was capable of substantial or 
commercially significant noninfringing uses, then constructive knowledge
of the infringement could not be imputed.  Rather, if substantial non-
infringing use was shown, the copyright owner would be required to show 
that the defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files73.
The reason this holding is damaging to the RIAA is the underlying rationale.  Each file is 
considered in the singular so there must be instantaneous recognition of its illegality.  The 
capstone for these issues is Napster, the first truly recognized and widely used peer-to-peer 
system, which was appraised at $515 million at the time the music industry brought suit74.  
67 Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, 
and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 Dayton L. Rev. 247, 272 n.81 (2001).
68 Id.
69 Jon Newton, Record Labels - More Powerful than the Police, Industry News (Aug. 4, 2003)
<http://news.dmusic.com/article/7345>. 
 
70 Id.
71
 Roy Mark, College File Swapping: Making the Illegal, Legal?, InternetNews.com (Sept. 1, 2003) 
<http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/3071331>.
72 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir., 2004).
73 Id. at 1160-1161.
74 26 Dayton L. Rev. at 267.
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For that price, the music industry would have gained access to all the users, network, and 
structure already in place75.  Instead they embarked on a path having little if no effect on 
adjusting social norms.  And from a cost-benefit point of view, the music industry has 
spent nearly as much fighting a battle as it would have cost to technologically improve the 
industry.  Finally, the industry fallout is not nearly as astronomical as prophesized by big 
media when aggregate economic factors are observed. 
While most of the onus is placed squarely on the shoulders of music downloading 
as a source of the media industry’s financial woes76, there is one major economic factor 
that must be considered.  The U.S. has been in a recession, which was sparked by the burst 
of the Dot-Com bubble77.  As is typical in a recession, when people have insecurity about 
their jobs and source of income, they decrease retail spending78.  The media companies are 
classified as retail goods and were bound to suffer some form of loss during a recession79.  
Between 1999 and 2001, non-auto retail sales decreased almost 5% per year80, which 
equates to approximately a 14.3% drop in consumer retail spending over the three year 
period.  When compared to the estimated 16% drop in consumer CD purchased proposed 
75
 If the RIAA or a related music consortium bought Napster, they would have had to contend with potential 
antitrust related issues.
76 Music Biz Blames Pirates, CDRinfo (Aug. 28, 2002)
<http://www.cdrinfo.com/Sections/News/Details.aspx?NewsId=6757>. 
 
77 Larry Dignan, Hooray, it's an Official Recession, News.com (Nov. 28, 2001)
<http://news.com.com/Hooray,+it's+an+official+recession/2010-1071_3-281613.html>. 
 
78 Mark Gongloff, When Will We Spend Again?, CNN Money (Oct. 26, 2001)
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79 See generally, Retail Industry: Top 10 Issues 2004-2005, Deloitte Consulting (2004)
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by the music industry81, the divergence in time of recession does not appear as detrimental 
as the industry makes it out to be.  There is a 1.7% difference, between the economic 
depression and the music industry; however, this is well within a de minimus deviation for 
an economic analysis.
So, we are in a recession, the media industries are screaming bloody murder as to 
the societal treatment of their copyrights, but the foundation for their lost sales complaint is 
arguably unfounded.  Further, the tide of lawsuit and lobbying actions has returned weak 
results.  When push comes to shove, what is happening to those who are creating the 
content that drives the media industries success?  Are we inappropriately defining our 
victims?
C. Using Copyright Laws to Increase the Stranglehold
Artists, musicians and all those who add to the creative foundation of our society 
are the ones who are suffering the byproducts of big media’s actions to manipulate their 
respective industries to increase copyright protection.  One of the foundations of creative 
content in society is the ability to compose and conduct new works based on deriving one’s 
own work from past artists.  Mr. Lessig prophesizes the death of this derivative use based 
on amplified statutory protection and increased copyright terms82.  Lessig believes the 
changing scope of copyright laws have lead to the unprecedented control over current 
derivative uses83.  The question is how far away is this doomsday prophecy?  The
81
 Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C’s: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and 
Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students 1 (April 5, 2004) (National Bureau of Economic Relations 
Working Paper No. w10874) (available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10874).
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additional limits on the future of creation protection are already in place and being locked 
down. 
Big media companies have worked to increase their hold on all creative markets by 
increasing lobbying efforts.  This concept is characterized in the increased restrictions 
imposed under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)84, the No Electronic Theft 
(NET) Act85 and Lessig’s hotly contested Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 
(CTEA)86.  While much of this legislation is very recent, some of the potential effects on 
creativity in the U.S. have been seen as a threat to the balance between the aggregate 
creative content in society as well as a threat to the Constitutional framer’s vision of 
copyright in of itself87.  All this protection is in response to the media companies, not the 
artists, response for help.  Therefore, the positively forecasted results for copyright 
equilibrium presented are heavily contentious. While few outside the media industry 
contend this is the best course of action, we are left to see the outcome in a future release.
V. Structuring the Right to Buy
If social norms cannot be changed, they can be harnessed, but first they must be 
understood.  Further, the industry and its applicable models must be considered before they 
can be implemented.
83 LESSIG, supra note 24, at 136.
84 Id. at 157.
85 Id. at 215.
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87 Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism?, 26 Colum. J.L. & Arts 17, 37 
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A. We Will Pay for Our Freedoms, Thank You
The big media industries have overlooked a very major point as they have 
constructed their strategy; consumers will pay more for the freedom of choice.   The new 
Napster music service is a prime example of paying a premium for access, delivery 
method, and format choice.  On Napster, it costs users $9.95 a month for a subscription to 
rent music tracks88.  If users wish to burn music to a CD to listen to it in a conventional CD 
player, they incur an additional $0.99 fee per song, all of which contains restricted use89.  
For comparison purposes, in 2003, the average price of a CD was $15.0690 and the average 
number of tracks on a rock CD was 1391.  This means, the average cost per song on a rock 
CD was $1.1692.  While this price may appear to justify a $0.99 price per song on Napster, 
consider the following information.  With over three million paying users on Napster, in 
order to get the same price as the average $1.16 per song on CD, based on the $9.95 
monthly subscription fee, a user would have to download more than 62 songs per month93.  
Based on the royalties paid to the music industry, there is no doubt they would be happy 
88 What is Napster?, Napster Website (visited Nov. 5, 2004) 
<http://www.napster.com/what_is_napster.html>.
89 Id.
90 2003 Yearend Statistics, Recording Industry Association of America (2004) 
<http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/2003yearEnd.pdf>.
91 Average Number of Tracks by CD for each Genre, IT Innovations and Concepts (visited Nov. 5, 2004) 
<http://www.itic.ca/DIC/music/2003/09/avg-content-cd-tracks.jpg>.
92
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93
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Email response from Dana Harris, Director of Napster Corporate Communications, in Los Angeles, CA 
(Nov. 16, 2004). 
23
with these results.  These astronomical numbers are not being reached on a monthly basis 
and users are paying, on average, more per song in order to have the freedom to choose 
single tracks94.
B. Miss the Boat and You May Fall Off the Face of the Earth
A traditional method of conducting an external environmental analysis is known as 
a SWOT analysis where a firm or industry dynamically examines the Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats based on a proposed action95.  A firms strengths 
are those resources and capabilities that are valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and 
sustainable96.  In the case of the music industry, the copyrights themselves do not 
necessarily fit the facet of being a sustainable competitive advantage, at least not in the 
long run.  While the copyrights are valuable and sustainable based on current federal 
regulation, technology has reduced their ability to be imitated.
A strategic weakness in the industry is the ability to control social norms.  While 
the industry is convinced they can do so, as stated before, the legal approach is having 
marginal returns at best97.  Further, the opportunities and threats come from an 
environmental analysis of how a specified approach effects the corresponding 
environments; namely the socio-cultural, economic, technological, and political/legal
environments98.  For example, when the media industries chose to embark on a route of 
94 Id.
95 MICHAEL HITT ET AL., supra note 27, at 52-59.
96 Id. at 84-88.
97 See generally, Part IV., Section B titled Damage Done, of this paper.
98 MICHAEL HITT ET AL., supra note 27, at 44-52.
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lobbying and lawsuits, it appeared to be a logical maneuver to attack those “stealing” from 
the industry.  However, the media industries failed to observe a dynamic analysis of the 
corresponding environments.  Taking a critical approach to this, as the industries 
manipulated the legal/political environment, society’s values and attitudes (social norms) 
were already in a state of transition.  Further, technology had advanced beyond what the 
industries could control and their actions had little success at stopping the technological 
dissemination99.  Acting on miscalculations or misclassifications has crippled the media 
industries on a grand scale.  Similar results can be observed in other industries based on a 
failure to properly apply a strategic analysis to their actions.
Misclassification of a company’s goal and directives will lead to a loss of revenue 
and failure to grow and progress in the appropriate direction100.  The misclassification and 
failure to appropriately forecast the repercussions from an action can also result in an 
unwanted regulatory scheme101.  This has come to light in the current case of radio and 
television regulation by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) which drove pop-
culture radio icon Howard Stern from the free airwaves to satellite broadcasting102.
Many believe radio companies like Clear Channel have a stranglehold on the radio 
market.  Companies of this stature have no incentive to influence the government’s 
regulatory regime over their broadcast medium when there is no alternative.  But, again, 
this is a case of a company being blindsided by the advent and acceptance of technological 
99 See generally, Part IV., Section B titled Damage Done, of this paper.
100 MICHAEL HITT ET AL., supra note 27, at 83.
101 Interview with William Spaulding, Lecturer of Management, Wayne State University School of Business 
Administration, in Detroit, MI (May 31, 2004).
102 Shockjock Stern to Go Satellite, CBS/AP News (Oct. 6, 2004)
<http://election.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/16/entertainment/main612355.shtml>.
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advancements103.  In the past few years, consumers have encountered a new means of 
receiving radio broadcasts, satellite radio104.  With this new medium, consumers, once 
again, are given the opportunity to pay a premium for the freedom of choice105.  Not only 
are consumers opting to pay, but they are moving in masses to the new medium106.  While 
market forces in of themselves have sparked much of this move, one of the key factors is 
the overregulation in traditional radio by the FCC107.  This heightened level of fines and 
regulation have pushed traditional radio advocates to leave the free airwaves and enter the 
pay marketplace108. As a byproduct for the traditional radio broadcasters who have not 
worked to properly influence FCC regulation, the result has been a loss of market share
and revenues109.  While this is one example of an industry being hit by the failure to 
properly assess their business position from a legal and regulatory standpoint, the failure to 
analyze one’s business purpose can have similar results.
A strong example of improper business analysis can be observed in the case of 
Eastman Kodak.  Focusing on its ability to produce high end prints from photographic 
film, Kodak, for years, regarded itself as a picture company110.  However, Kodak was 
103 Shock Jocks Boost Satellite Radio Profile, Associated Press (Oct. 19, 2004)
<http://www.forbes.com/associatedpress/feeds/ap/2004/10/09/ap1584222.html>. 
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crippled by lost revenue with the advent of digital imaging111.  As the price of digital 
cameras dropped, more people were introduced to digital technology and fewer people 
paid to expose traditional prints.  Instead, people transitioned and began storing them in 
digital form on their computers.  It was not until Kodak reverted to a model of an imaging 
company that they were able to recover market share112.  By viewing themselves as an 
imaging company and focusing on the images associated with any camera, digital or film, 
Kodak appropriately moved to a structure focused on customer demand and an evolving 
marketplace.  
VI. Don’t Look the Other Way, Act a Different Way
Traditional media is a dying industry.  Traditional television, movie and music 
companies need to continually work harder to maintain their present position113.  Further, 
two primary indicators of a dying goliath are a consolidation or excess industry mergers in 
conjunction with extensive lobbying in Washington114.  The media companies are pushing 
both of these aspects at an exceptional rate115 and must consider a new approach in order to 
survive.  The new model must strike a balance between fair use for innovation and 
protection of copyrights.  This requires a complete reassessment from the media industries.  
110 Laura Rich, Case Study: Eastman Kodak Co., CIO Insight (June 1, 2004)
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Copyright law should be seen as protecting public interest, not just individual creators116.  
This view will permit the copyright framework to diverge from a monetary focus and 
target influencing creativity117. Further, the adoption of the view that copyright law is 
there purely to protect the copyright holder has lead to the oligopoly we currently have.
Competition is coming and media companies have the ability to grab a lion’s share 
of the new markets by utilizing the first mover advantage in the future.  Inefficient 
oligopoly structures cannot be maintained in a free market economy such as the U.S. 
because competitors will move in to fill the void in niche markets and attempt to grow 
using their specific competitive advantages118.  Social norms indicate people pay for choice 
and quality119 and legal barriers are just another hurdle, not a wall to consumer demand.  
A. The Basic Framework
The media companies need to look at themselves as logistics companies.  Based on 
an environmental analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in the 
media industry, the copyrights are no longer a strategic advantage however, the marketing 
and distribution network the media companies have at their disposal can provide an 
advantage.  The media industries strengths are not the product, but rather your ability to get 
product to market.  The problem is not production.  Technology has lowered these costs to 
make them more accessible to all artists and media companies alike, but getting the 
116 Jeremy Paul Sirota, Analog to Digital: Harnessing Peer Computing, 55 Hastings L.J. 759, 780-781 (Feb. 
2004).
117 Id.
118 Interview with William Spaulding, Lecturer of Management, Wayne State University School of Business 
Administration, in Detroit, MI (July 19, 2004).
119 See generally, Part V., Section A, titled We Will Pay for Our Freedoms, Thank You, of this paper.
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product to the public is still difficult120.  While anyone can develop an idea, song, movie 
concept or show, marketing and distribution is the true barrier to which the media 
industries can grant access.  This competitive advantage must be utilized to survive.
The copyright holders will benefit from this shift.  They will have the ability to hire 
the best distribution company for their product, not necessarily those who have locked 
them into long-term contracts and hold them captive.  The media companies will resist this 
aspect because they already have a captive artist base.  However, a shift from the current,
vertically integrated market scheme is necessary to eliminate the history-dependant path in 
the industries.  While the old method was feasible, the competitive landscape has changed 
and is no longer being optimized.
As a logistics company, there are numerous constituents to be served.  There are 
artists who need their product picked up and end users (consumers) who will receive the 
product in multiple formats.  Neither can be ignored because both are necessary for the 
model to operate properly.   Further, efficiency and time-critical delivery are necessary 
elements.  Therefore, there must be a focus on technology advancements for security and 
infrastructure.  With this model, the option to have the traditional method coexist is not 
dead, but the primary focus shifts to a more profitable method of operation.  This is much 
more related diversification than traditionally done in media, but will provide for a better 
ability to refine and focus on true competitive advantages and core competencies.  Further, 
based on consumer desire to pay more for the right to choose between delivery methods, 
the more novel the media industries can be, and the greater the premium they can charge 
for their product.
120 Cost of a CD, Recording Industry Association of America (visited Dec. 15, 2004) 
<http://www.riaa.com/news/marketingdata/cost.asp>.
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B. Protecting the Creators
Consumers will pay for choice and quality and this norm must be optimized.  This 
is not to say those who create what society considers “good works” deserve more 
protection than those creative pieces not considered as high quality.  However, it is not 
exclusively the job of the media industries to perpetually use lobbying power to extend 
copyright law.  The focus for protecting the copyright holders from the point of view of the 
media companies needs to be in security protocols and systems integration.  As exhibited 
with the software industry, companies need to work within the bounds of the technology 
available, not work against it121.  
C. Technology Strategies
Some advocates contend there is no reason to invest in new technologies and digital 
distribution methods because they will simply become outdated and be cheaper to 
implement in the future122.  While this argument has some merit, the onus is on distribution 
and security companies to address the financial issues inherent in their operations.  Further, 
there are multiple strategies involved in technology integration including a first mover 
strategy, second mover strategy as well as a late adopter strategy, each with relative 
advantages and disadvantage123.  Based on the differences, one cannot argue that not 
adopting or constantly taking a “wait-and-see” approach is always right simply because 
technology will inevitably decrease in cost over time; that guarantees no change and 
121 See generally, Part II, titled Content Distribution and Piracy Battle Plans, of this paper.
122 LESSIG, supra note 24, at 166.
123 MICHAEL HITT ET AL., supra note 27, at 149-150.
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promises death124.  The media industries have held to a history-dependent path as 
exemplified by the repetition of legal and lobbying actions each time there is a new 
technological jump125.  While copying what the competition does will provide flexibility of 
resources, some competitive aspects will be lost126.  Certain companies, such as Sony 
Corporation have made their niche with a first mover advantage by introducing and 
perfecting technological advances before the relative competition127, while others such as 
Hitachi have exercised a follower strategy in order to optimize the late adopters market128.  
Empirical data shows different competitors within different industries reap benefits from 
either the first or second mover strategies129.  However, this same data also points a 
company in the direction of a first mover strategy or a hybrid strategy when there is a need 
to focus on technological advancements and research and development in order to 
maximize returns130.  The technology adoption strategy for content distribution within the 
media industries needs to be considered based on the same grounds.  A hybrid strategy 
employed by in-house development to more effectively and efficiently deploy resources 
will perpetuate a goal of meeting consumer demand as it evolves over time.  In addition, it 
124 Han T.J. Smit & Lenos Trigeorgis, Quantifying the Strategic Option Value of Technology Investments, 
Real Options - Theory Meets Practice 8th Annual International Conference, at 4 (June 2004) (available at 
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secures an evolutionary growth strategy for big media.  This cannot be a static strategy, but 
one continually providing more differentiation for consumer and creator alike.
D. Structural and Supply Chain Integration
Media companies need to shift focus away from their current vertically integrated 
structure.  The media companies have a strategy of both forward and backward integration 
to control the entire supply chain.  Vertical integration is defined as the degree to which a 
company owns its upstream and downstream supply chain131.  This has resulted in multiple 
inefficiencies based on a lack of competition from suppliers and higher overall operating 
costs132.  These costs have perpetually been pasted onto the consumer and made the end 
product pass beyond the threshold of equilibrium price based on relative differentiation133.  
Within the media industries, the largest example of the failure of the vertical integration 
scheme is the merger of AOL and Time-Warner in 2000134.  This merger was supposed to 
add efficiencies and lower industry costs, but resulted in such a failure that over $160 
billion in market value was destroyed based on the inability to optimize supply chain 
synergies135.  Further, when competition can easily be obliterated based on game theory 
and collusion, there is no incentive for the oligopoly members to operate efficiently.136
131 Strategic Management, Quick MBA (visited Nov. 12, 2004) <http://www.quickmba.com/strategy/vertical-
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This has been perpetuated by vertical integration.  Wall Street knows this based on AOL-
Time Warner; the consumers know this based on exercising alternative options; but the 
media industries seem blind to the fact.  The media industries must consider a process of 
decentralizing operations to maximize competitive efficiencies.  Again, this change will 
not be welcomed because it threatens the oligopoly, but it is necessary to lower costs, meet 
demand, and revive the industry.
E. Disputes Will Arise
As in the software industry, when there is a focus on digital media distribution,
piracy is inevitable.  Whether the piracy is willful or accidental, someone will find a way 
not only to usurp the system and security, but distribute the result.  This, in and of itself, is 
not a reason to avoid entering a market or upgrading one’s distribution network.  It is, 
however, reason enough to consider how these claims will be handled.  The current 
method has been a wide-scale legal assault on distributors and users in the courtroom with 
marginal results at best137.  Forcing a party to settle because they are unaware of their legal 
rights or unable to afford adequate counsel138 does not solve the underlying problem of 
protecting the copyright holders while educating the public139.  The media industries need 
to consider an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) model in order to streamline the 
process for all parties.  
137 See generally, Part IV., Section B titled Damage Done, of this paper.
138 LESSIG, supra note 24, at 200.
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An ADR model will provide a number of unrealized benefits.  In general, the 
mediation process was instituted and expanded because it reduces many of the risks 
associated with comparable litigation regarding both tangible and intangible costs140.  
Tangible costs include the dollar value placed on litigation in court fees and legal fees; 
intangible costs include those related to lost productivity and emotional strain on the 
parties themselves141.  Admittedly, there are relative risks in ADR including lower average 
settlements142, but as the situation currently stands, the average consumer case settles for 
approximately $3,000143.  Further, the aggregate risks of ADR tend to be outweighed by 
the benefits in a copyright suit144.  If the media industries wish to hold true to their 
principles such that legal action is necessary in order to protect the artists145, then an 
alternative dispute method will better protect the parties involved146.  Claims are settled in 
a timely manner, the costs are lower for all parties, and judicial economy is maximized.  
F. Show Me the Money
The question should not be can this model make money, but rather how long can
the media distributors act as the old guard before the entire industry implodes.  The signs 
140 Kevin M. Lemley, I'll Make Him an Offer He Can't Refuse: A Proposed Model for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 Akron L. Rev. 287, 312-313 (2004).
141 Id. at 313-314.
142 Id.
.
143 Paul Roberts, RIAA Sues 532 'John Does', IDG News Service (Jan. 21, 2004)
<http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,114387,00.asp>. 
 
144 Lemley, supra note 140, at 315-317.
145 Marks, supra note 139.
146 37 Akron L. Rev. at 326.
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are there, what can be classified as “old media” companies are falling into a perilous 
situation.  New competitors are setting up distribution channels that will allow copyrighted 
artists to reach the masses with their work in a manner that will not require current 
distribution channels147.  Unfortunately, the media companies have allowed their size and 
bureaucracy to place them in a position many other oligopoly industries have found 
themselves, fighting for minute pieces of market share while relatively small competitors 
begin to dominate the marketplace.  As observed in the U.S. automotive industry, long 
thought to be one of the strongest oligopolies, the lack of concentration on entering 
competitors has resulted in foreign companies taking advantage of system efficiencies and 
changes in governmental regulation148 to bring down the oligopoly149.  The software 
industry presents another example of industry monoliths reconsidering their strategies and 
producing a positive outcome.
There is no question that a select number of competitors dominate the software 
industry.  Companies like Microsoft, Oracle, Dell, and IBM to name a few150, command 
their respective niche in the same manner companies like MGM, Sony, and Viacom 
dominate in the media industries151.  However, new entrants and technologies provide a 
147 Eric Butterfield, Record and Promote Your Own Music, PC World Online (Sept. 28, 2004) 
<http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,117926,00.asp>.
148 Kerry A. Chase, Economies of Scale, Domestic Politics, and Trade Conflict at 26-27 (1999) (Tufts 
University Department of Political Science) (available at 
http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/faculty/chase/economies.pdf ). 
 
149 Toyota, a Japanese manufacturer, is targeting a global market share of 15 percent by the end of the 
decade, putting it ahead of the current U.S. auto leader, General Motors and further dominating the U.S. 
automotive oligopoly known as The Big Three (Ford, GM, and Daimler-Chrysler).
MICHELINE MAYNARD, THE END OF DETROIT 15 (Paperback ed., Doubleday 2004).
150 Wylie Wong, Software Giants Unite for Web Services, CNET News.com (Feb. 5, 2002) 
<http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-830090.html>. 
 
151 Industry Brief: Music Recording 1, supra note 37.
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constant threat to the software giants’ respective market share.  Most recently and 
continually is the attack by open-source operating system Linux on Microsoft Windows152.
However, even with the assault from pirates and competitors alike, the software giants are 
able to prevail through a multi-tiered approach including legal, legislative, and competitive 
reassessment.  None of these factors alone are enough to retain a lead in the industry, 
however, in the aggregate, they are able to survive, grow, and thrive.  Not by 
underestimating and neglecting the customer and the competitor, but rather working within 
the respective bounds to achieve optimal results.
Conclusion
Neither technology nor pirates are the source of all evil.  In this day and age, they 
are two factors to be worked with and dealt with, but not disregarded.  An industry cannot 
ignore these external environmental factors when designing its strategy and a failure to 
recognize this will result in a failure to grow. Sustained growth is not an accidental 
endeavor; it must be planned for and executed in a systematic manner to achieve optimal 
results153.  
In recent years, technology advancements and the accessibility to means of 
information reception have greatly reduced the cost to consumers and digital media content 
providers.  However, along with these advancements have been a number of byproducts 
associated with the territory.  These factors include the need for enhanced security, a 
152
"Linux garnered a 27% share of operating-system software for computer servers sold last year, up from 
24% in 1999 and 17% in 1998, according to market-researcher International Data Corp."
Linux Gains Market Share, Respectability, Librenix – Information for Linux System Administrators ¶ 1 (last 
updated June 27, 2003) <http://librenix.com/?inode=784>.
153
 Interview with Bruce Lynskey, Clinical Professor of Management, Vanderbilt University Owen Graduate 
School of Management, in Nashville, TN (Oct. 21, 2004).
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reevaluation of the current operating environment, and a reassessment of consumer 
demand for media in multiple formats. 
The media industries have become apathetic over the years.  The major threat to 
their existence is not piracy or peer-to-peer file sharing, but rather the reduced barriers to 
entry resulting in new competitors, threatening the very existence of the oligopoly or cartel 
the media companies have worked so hard to build up and barricade from the rest of 
business.  No oligopoly likes being threatened, however if the collusion continues, the 
competition will find breaks in the dam to exploit.  The fact of the matter is the old media 
model is representative of a dying industry gasping for air as it clings to market share and 
overregulation.  However, this is only prolonging the death.
The media companies have lost focus.  They push for stiffer copyright laws, longer 
periods of enforcement, and additional statutory coverage, but this strategy is not helping 
to expand the aggregate creative content in society.  The artists, the parties who truly 
deserve the copyrights are being left out of the equation.  The media industries are not 
gaining the results the artists deserve through their legal assault on pirates alone.  
Technology has not been the only change; social norms have evolved since the 
Dot-Com Era.  For better or worse, consumers care less about the legal implications of 
their actions and more about the quality of the product they are buying.  A failure to 
recognize the benefit of consumers’ desire to pay for their freedom of choice is a failure to 
recognize a market niche that can easily be exploited and has been exploited by companies 
such as Napster and Apple.  
The continued governmental lobbying to eliminate any inkling of a revolt amongst 
consumers must be curtailed.  The media industries are failing to look at the long-term 
37
implications of their increased regulation.  They will drive consumers to new media; this is 
best exemplified by the FCC’s recent overregulation driving radio personalities and 
consumers to pay for satellite radio.  
If the media companies are truly interested in cultivating and helping artists, they 
need to start acting like it; rhetoric will only get a company so far.  The media industries 
have seen other industries like software fight through their battle with digital distribution, 
which has resulted in decreased piracy.  The media industries must make a dynamic, 
strategic reevaluation of their respective industries and focus on their true strengths, 
namely their distribution and marketing machines.  Further, they need to reassess their 
supply chain management and vertical integration plans to create as much efficiency in the 
system as possible.  This will reduce product price and decrease time to market while 
capitalizing on social norms.  
Finally, the media industries need to reconsider their legal approach.  Piracy will 
always exist and while lawsuits may be optimal for large scale distributors, they do little to 
equitably resolve individual disputes.  They also do not fulfill the media industries desire 
to “educate” the public that piracy is bad.  An alternative dispute resolution process will 
not only streamline claims, they have the potential to maximize the return on investment 
into an ADR system.
No one ever said managing an industry was easy.  The external economic factors 
that exist in business have come down in a crushing manner around the media companies.  
By reevaluating their operating structure and consumer demand the media distributors can 
come out on top and continue to perpetuate; it has been done before.  Continuing to drive 
in the current direction will not lead to any form of Fountain of Youth for preservation, but 
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rather result in the same fate as the Fountain’s other seekers, nothing more than an 
untimely demise.
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Appendix A – DVD Growth 1998-2003154
Year Sell-Through DVDs 
(In Millions of Units)
Percent Change from 
Prior Year
1998 32.7 ---
1999 91.3 35.82%
2000 174.4 52.35%
2001 350.0 49.83%
2002 650.6 53.80%
2003 985.3 66.03%
154 U.S. Entertainment Industry: 2003 MPA Market Statistics, Motion Picture Association Worldwide Market 
Research, at 30 (2003).
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Appendix B – A-La-Carte Pricing in a Mixed Bundle Environment155
Network 
Type
Subscribers Bundled Monthly A-La-Carte fee needed to 
replace lost network revenue
Subscriber 
price
Bundled Mixed 
bundled
Revenue 
per 
month
Ad 
revenue 
per 
month
Subscriber Ad Marketing Total
(000,000) (000,000) (with cable 
mark-up)
General 87 70 $0.67 $0.48 $1.12 $0.11 $0.38 $1.61 $2.72
News 86 60 $0.20 $0.20 $0.50 $0.10 $0.16 $0.76 $1.28
Older 80 52 $0.18 $0.12 $0.60 $0.09 $0.20 $0.89 $1.50
Younger 84 63 $0.25 $0.24 $0.50 $0.08 $0.20 $0.78 $1.32
E. Niche 34 20 $0.09 $0.06 $0.45 $0.07 $0.15 $0.67 $1.13
E. Mass 64 38 $0.08 $0.09 $0.40 $0.12 $0.17 $0.69 $1.16
Definitions:
- General – mainstream networks such as ESPN, Lifetime, USA and Nickelodeon
- News – news networks such as ABC, CNN, and Fox News
- Older – older trending networks such as A&E and Bravo 
- Younger – younger trending networks such as Disney, Comedy Central and MTV
- E. Niche – emerging niche networks such as Oxygen, BET Jazz, and Soapnet
- E. Mass – emerging mass market networks such as The Family Channel, SciFi and 
Court TV
155 Kimmelman & Cooper, supra note 66, at 53.
